An Essay on Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts
Xiao Cheng-min
Abstract
Xiao Cheng-min
Abstract
Modern corporations can reduce transaction costs,but create agency costs.As a concept developed to reduce agency costs in theory,corporate governance has several measurements in empirical research.Not all measurements have the same effect on agency costs.Based on related literatures,this paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on agency costs in three dimensions: expression forms,behavioral subjects and its relationship with institutional environment.To discriminate the measurement of corporate governance and its effect on agency costs would be helpful to the hypothesis development,choice of proxies,and results explanation of related research.
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Modern corporations can reduce transaction costs,but create agency costs.As a concept developed to reduce agency costs in theory,corporate governance has several measurements in empirical research.Not all measurements have the same effect on agency costs.Based on related literatures,this paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on agency costs in three dimensions: expression forms,behavioral subjects and its relationship with institutional environment.To discriminate the measurement of corporate governance and its effect on agency costs would be helpful to the hypothesis development,choice of proxies,and results explanation of related research.
Key concepts: Agency cost, Corporate governance, Agency (philosophy), Transaction cost, Principal–agent problem, Accounting, Business, Empirical research