2008Shoudu Jingji Maoyi Daxue xuebaoRequires access

Ownership Structure,Allocation of Control Rights,and Firm Value

Zhongwei Zhao

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Abstract

In the company with concentrated ownership,controlling shareholders can play an actively role in the corporate governance.The separation of ownership and control will hurt firm value,and the match of ownership and control will benefit the maximization of firm value.Using 822 Chinese non-financial listed companies as sam- ple,we examine empirically the effect of ownership and control rights on firm value.The results show that:the re- lationship between ownership of the first large shareholder and firm value is a U shape;there is no significant cor- relative relationship between ownership nature of controlling shareholder and firm value;there is a positive relation- ship between the control rights of large shareholder and firm value;and the ownership of non-controlling share- holders has a positive effect on firm value.

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In the company with concentrated ownership,controlling shareholders can play an actively role in the corporate governance.The separation of ownership and control will hurt firm value,and the match of ownership and control will benefit the maximization of firm value.Using 822 Chinese non-financial listed companies as sam- ple,we examine empirically the effect of ownership and control rights on firm value.The results show that:the re- lationship between ownership of the first large shareholder and firm value is a U shape;there is no significant cor- relative relationship between ownership nature of controlling shareholder and firm value;there is a positive relation- ship between the control rights of large shareholder and firm value;and the ownership of non-controlling share- holders has a positive effect on firm value.

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Available abstract

In the company with concentrated ownership,controlling shareholders can play an actively role in the corporate governance.The separation of ownership and control will hurt firm value,and the match of ownership and control will benefit the maximization of firm value.Using 822 Chinese non-financial listed companies as sam- ple,we examine empirically the effect of ownership and control rights on firm value.The results show that:the re- lationship between ownership of the first large shareholder and firm value is a U shape;there is no significant cor- relative relationship between ownership nature of controlling shareholder and firm value;there is a positive relation- ship between the control rights of large shareholder and firm value;and the ownership of non-controlling share- holders has a positive effect on firm value.

Key concepts: Enterprise value, Shareholder, Corporate governance, Business, Control (management), Value (mathematics), Maximization, Market value added

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