An Analysis of E-Government Service Outsourcing Theory and Project Incentive Mechanism
Ren Zhi-tao
Abstract
Ren Zhi-tao
Abstract
The e-government service outsourcing is an important means for government to support its sustainable development.The core of such a new management model lies in its correct manipulation with a view to give full play to its functions.Relevant theoretical problems,trends,operational models and selection concerning e-Government service out-sourcing are investigated,and through introduction of gaming theory,the incentive model for e-government project construction is set up.
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The e-government service outsourcing is an important means for government to support its sustainable development.The core of such a new management model lies in its correct manipulation with a view to give full play to its functions.Relevant theoretical problems,trends,operational models and selection concerning e-Government service out-sourcing are investigated,and through introduction of gaming theory,the incentive model for e-government project construction is set up.
Key concepts: Outsourcing, Incentive, Government (linguistics), Business, Service (business), Mechanism (biology), Core (optical fiber), Process management