A SECURE, ATOMIC ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PROTOCOL AND ITS FORMAL VERIFICATION
Wu Zhi
Abstract
Wu Zhi
Abstract
Popularization and acceptance of electronic commerce mainly depends on solution of the following properties: security, atomicity, privacy and anonymity. Formal description and analysis are an efficient way to describe electronic commerce protocols and verify their properties. In electronic commerce protocols for transactions of physical goods, three properties are needed: security, atomicity, and privacy. In this paper, a secure, atomic electronic commerce protocol named BEARCAT and its formal description are introduced. The protocol is formally analyzed for its strength and correctness by means of proving its desired properties using BAN style logic in the presence of an intruder.
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Popularization and acceptance of electronic commerce mainly depends on solution of the following properties: security, atomicity, privacy and anonymity. Formal description and analysis are an efficient way to describe electronic commerce protocols and verify their properties. In electronic commerce protocols for transactions of physical goods, three properties are needed: security, atomicity, and privacy. In this paper, a secure, atomic electronic commerce protocol named BEARCAT and its formal description are introduced. The protocol is formally analyzed for its strength and correctness by means of proving its desired properties using BAN style logic in the presence of an intruder.
Key concepts: Atomicity, Computer science, Correctness, Protocol (science), Anonymity, Computer security, Cryptographic protocol, Formal verification