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The Relationship between Shareholdings of Insiders and the Governance Efficiency of Listed Companies:An Empirical Study

Zhijie Yang

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationships between shareholdings of insiders and governance efficiency of the listed companies.Regression results of 1002 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company observations in 2003 show that,as an incentive mechanism,shareholdings of insiders play an active role in corporate governance.However,there are some defects in our insider shareholding system,especially for state-owned companies.Therefore,some suggestions are put forward to solve the problems.

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What this paper is about

This paper examines the relationships between shareholdings of insiders and governance efficiency of the listed companies.Regression results of 1002 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company observations in 2003 show that,as an incentive mechanism,shareholdings of insiders play an active role in corporate governance.However,there are some defects in our insider shareholding system,especially for state-owned companies.Therefore,some suggestions are put forward to solve the problems.

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Available abstract

This paper examines the relationships between shareholdings of insiders and governance efficiency of the listed companies.Regression results of 1002 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed company observations in 2003 show that,as an incentive mechanism,shareholdings of insiders play an active role in corporate governance.However,there are some defects in our insider shareholding system,especially for state-owned companies.Therefore,some suggestions are put forward to solve the problems.

Key concepts: Corporate governance, Incentive, Business, Insider, Accounting, Mechanism (biology), Industrial organization, Finance

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