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2009•Journal of Zhoukou Normal UniversityRequires access

A model for the causes of moral hazard of university faculty:Based on a principal-agent model

Yutao Hua

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Abstract

This article analyses the moral hazard problem of the university faculty using the principal-agent model.The model helped us to confirm the new characteristics of the contract between principal and agent.The causes of moral hazard is mainly due to information asymmetry.The main conclusion is that the key to reduce moral hazard of the university faculty is the establishment of incentive mechanisms.

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What this paper is about

This article analyses the moral hazard problem of the university faculty using the principal-agent model.The model helped us to confirm the new characteristics of the contract between principal and agent.The causes of moral hazard is mainly due to information asymmetry.The main conclusion is that the key to reduce moral hazard of the university faculty is the establishment of incentive mechanisms.

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Available abstract

This article analyses the moral hazard problem of the university faculty using the principal-agent model.The model helped us to confirm the new characteristics of the contract between principal and agent.The causes of moral hazard is mainly due to information asymmetry.The main conclusion is that the key to reduce moral hazard of the university faculty is the establishment of incentive mechanisms.

Key concepts: Moral hazard, Principal (computer security), Incentive, Information asymmetry, Hazard, Principal–agent problem, Actuarial science, Business

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