Is There Any Excessive Incentive to Technological Innovation Performance of“Innovative Enterprise”Executives
Wang Jian-hu
Abstract
Wang Jian-hu
Abstract
Using the number of patents as a measurement of innovative performance and taking the listed companieswith the title ofNational Innovative Enterprisesas the sample,the paper makes a study on the impact of execu-tive's compensation and equity incentive on technological innovation performance by applying the negative binomi-nal regression model. The results show that the executive's compensation and equity incentive of innovative listedcompanies have a positive impact on the innovation. The effect of compensation incentive is different between execu-tives and board of directors. The total amount of compensation of top three executives has an inverted U-sharp rela-tionship with the number of patent applications,which presents a remarkable diminishing return and excessive in-centive effect,whereas it does not exist in the context of top three directors. Finally,the paper analyzes the re-sults and gives conclusions.
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Using the number of patents as a measurement of innovative performance and taking the listed companieswith the title ofNational Innovative Enterprisesas the sample,the paper makes a study on the impact of execu-tive's compensation and equity incentive on technological innovation performance by applying the negative binomi-nal regression model. The results show that the executive's compensation and equity incentive of innovative listedcompanies have a positive impact on the innovation. The effect of compensation incentive is different between execu-tives and board of directors. The total amount of compensation of top three executives has an inverted U-sharp rela-tionship with the number of patent applications,which presents a remarkable diminishing return and excessive in-centive effect,whereas it does not exist in the context of top three directors. Finally,the paper analyzes the re-sults and gives conclusions.
Key concepts: Incentive, Equity (law), Compensation (psychology), Business, Context (archaeology), Executive compensation, Sample (material), Industrial organization