Influence of Change in the Types of Controlling Shareholders on Corporate Performance——Based on the Empirical Research of Listed Companies in China
Guoping Li
Abstract
Guoping Li
Abstract
Using cross-sectional data on Chinese public companies,this paper studies the relationship between change in the types of controlling shareholders and corporate performance.The result shows as follows: first,changes in the types of controlling shareholders did not have significant effects on corporate performance.The owner obsence of State-owned capital mainly embodies that of state shares.Second,compared with state-owned ownership and private ownership,change into state legal person ownership is most likely to have positive effects on corporate performance.Third,private ownership has no significant effects on corporate performance,which may owe to the profit disguising of private owners.
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Using cross-sectional data on Chinese public companies,this paper studies the relationship between change in the types of controlling shareholders and corporate performance.The result shows as follows: first,changes in the types of controlling shareholders did not have significant effects on corporate performance.The owner obsence of State-owned capital mainly embodies that of state shares.Second,compared with state-owned ownership and private ownership,change into state legal person ownership is most likely to have positive effects on corporate performance.Third,private ownership has no significant effects on corporate performance,which may owe to the profit disguising of private owners.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Business, Accounting, Empirical research, China, State ownership, Profit (economics), Corporate governance