Research on Fund Management Fee Rate Design Based on the Performance
NI Su-yun
Abstract
NI Su-yun
Abstract
The information asymmetry between fund managers and investors about fund managers' investment ability is thought of as one of the main reasons causing the low subscription rate of different funds in issuance. Then, under the way of option pricing, the management fee rate is affiliated with fund return and market return, the management fee rate spread is designed, and the option's prices and profits shareholders can obtain are computed through Monte Carlo simulation. At last, the difference in parameters settings of fund managers with different ability is also analyzed in order to attract shareholders' subscription interest.
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The information asymmetry between fund managers and investors about fund managers' investment ability is thought of as one of the main reasons causing the low subscription rate of different funds in issuance. Then, under the way of option pricing, the management fee rate is affiliated with fund return and market return, the management fee rate spread is designed, and the option's prices and profits shareholders can obtain are computed through Monte Carlo simulation. At last, the difference in parameters settings of fund managers with different ability is also analyzed in order to attract shareholders' subscription interest.
Key concepts: Performance fee, Management fee, Shareholder, Business, Manager of managers fund, Rate of return, Investment fund, Investment management