Study on Regulation Mechanism of Resale Price Maintenance Driven by Double Factors

As a kind of vertical controlling tool,resale price maintenance(RPM) is frequently used by manufacturers and becomes the one of the most controversy vertical restraints.In China,the recent antitrust case that nine powdered milk manufacturers including biostime controlled retail price of powdered milk product through the RPM arrangements between producers and retailers,left RPM the place where the wind and waves are highest alone.This paper explores the regulated factors of RPM strategy,combining the theory with the practices,and then analyses the regulated objects of RPM strategy,regarding the antitrust and regulation cases for RPM as an criteria.We find that RPM could facilitate manufacturers cartelizing,which leads to higher retail price,in contrast,as a tool of exclusion,RPM lowers retail price,therefore,firms' RPM behavior under the case of collusion should be regulated.In the case of the part-collusion,the regulated objects are manufacturers participating collusion and the retailers participating collusion.The regulated objects of initiative collusion of all are price-leading manufacturers,however,that of system-constraint collusion of all is the relevant RPM antitrust-immunity mechanism.Further,in view of the upstream manufacturers implanting RPM strategy,this study divides the regulated path of RPM into punitive-regulated path,regulated-focal path and immune-regulated path,according to the different implementing factors and the different regulated objects for RPM.