The Obligations of Shareholders of Company Control
DU Xue-fang
Abstract
DU Xue-fang
Abstract
In general,the controlling shareholders for the majority of companies enjoy the right of control,so in a special position in the company decision-making.In order to realize their own interests,the controlling shareholders often use its dominant position,in the exercise of violating the interests of the company and the interests of the control over the minority shareholders.Controlling shareholders not to abuse is a very serious phenomenon in China 's stock companies.Controlling shareholders to the legal obligation,balancing conflict of interest among shareholders,protecting minority shareholders and other stakeholders rights,not only have a broad theoretical basis and practical significance,but also is the inevitable choice of company legislation.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
In general,the controlling shareholders for the majority of companies enjoy the right of control,so in a special position in the company decision-making.In order to realize their own interests,the controlling shareholders often use its dominant position,in the exercise of violating the interests of the company and the interests of the control over the minority shareholders.Controlling shareholders not to abuse is a very serious phenomenon in China 's stock companies.Controlling shareholders to the legal obligation,balancing conflict of interest among shareholders,protecting minority shareholders and other stakeholders rights,not only have a broad theoretical basis and practical significance,but also is the inevitable choice of company legislation.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Business, Legislation, Obligation, Shareholder resolution, Control (management), Position (finance), Corporate law