On Logical Truth From the View of Correspondence Theory of Truth
Long Xiao-ping
Abstract
Long Xiao-ping
Abstract
From the view of correspondence theory of we think that logical truth is absolutely different from realistic truth. We should not consider logical truth as a kind of truth, but a kind of valid formulas of logic. Meanwhile, logical truth is consistent with the valid formulas of logic inference. The aim of logic is to seek logical truth.
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From the view of correspondence theory of we think that logical truth is absolutely different from realistic truth. We should not consider logical truth as a kind of truth, but a kind of valid formulas of logic. Meanwhile, logical truth is consistent with the valid formulas of logic inference. The aim of logic is to seek logical truth.
Key concepts: Coherence theory of truth, Logical truth, Logical connective, Pragmatic theory of truth, Truth table, Semantic theory of truth, Truth value, Truth function