The Decision Strategies on Merger of Upstream and Downstream Firms
Xin Ma
Abstract
Xin Ma
Abstract
The decision strategies on merger of the upstream and dowstream firms in an industry are discussed in this paper. A competition model with two firms in both upstream and downstream is established. The analysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises take the horizontal and vertical merging as strategies variables, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the upstream and downstream enterprises' horizontal merger respectively. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the conflict of interests among the enterprises, the government and the consumers in the merger.
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The decision strategies on merger of the upstream and dowstream firms in an industry are discussed in this paper. A competition model with two firms in both upstream and downstream is established. The analysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises take the horizontal and vertical merging as strategies variables, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the upstream and downstream enterprises' horizontal merger respectively. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the conflict of interests among the enterprises, the government and the consumers in the merger.
Key concepts: Downstream (manufacturing), Upstream (networking), Upstream and downstream (DNA), Business, Industrial organization, Competition (biology), Subgame perfect equilibrium, Microeconomics