An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Board Governance Compared with SME and Main of Chinese Listed Companies——Based on the Panel Data of 2004-2006
Weizhu Wang
Abstract
Weizhu Wang
Abstract
The construction of board system of two Chinese types listed companies is significantly improved in resent years but still in the low-level stage.Listed companies are generally meet with the requirements of institutional constraints,but no spontaneous.The SME listed companies set up a light-based board of directors which is helpful to reduce agency costs.Because of the institutional constraints, the efficiency of long—term incentives of the board of SME listed companies is better than that of the Main listed companies and it is benefit to match the control of residual rights with the claim of residual as well as the cultivation of long—term value.The independence of the board is worse because most of SME listed companies are private companies,the dual leadership structure of SME listed companies is good for rapid decision—making,but not in favor of checks and balances.SME listed companies pay more attention to the construction of the system of audit committee,while the construction of other committees are worse than the Main listed companies.
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The construction of board system of two Chinese types listed companies is significantly improved in resent years but still in the low-level stage.Listed companies are generally meet with the requirements of institutional constraints,but no spontaneous.The SME listed companies set up a light-based board of directors which is helpful to reduce agency costs.Because of the institutional constraints, the efficiency of long—term incentives of the board of SME listed companies is better than that of the Main listed companies and it is benefit to match the control of residual rights with the claim of residual as well as the cultivation of long—term value.The independence of the board is worse because most of SME listed companies are private companies,the dual leadership structure of SME listed companies is good for rapid decision—making,but not in favor of checks and balances.SME listed companies pay more attention to the construction of the system of audit committee,while the construction of other committees are worse than the Main listed companies.
Key concepts: Business, Accounting, Corporate governance, Audit committee, Incentive, Listed company, Control (management), Independence (probability theory)