2010Unpublished venueRequires access

Research on the Electorate's Economic Voting Behavior in the Taiwan Leader's Elections Since 1996

Zhang Hu

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Abstract

Economic voting theory suggests that the incumbent's economic performance determining electoral behavior, in other words, voters who think that the incumbent should take responsibility for the poor economic performance, or assess the future economy is pessimistic, will vote for the opposition political party in order to punish the ruling party; on the contrary, they will continue to support the ruling party. Although Taiwan's election is to adopt the West's electoral system, the electorate's economic voting behavior (including retrospective voting and prospective voting) are showed strong heterogeneity in the Taiwan area leader's elections since 1996. This phenomenon is closely related to Taiwan's special political ecology and the unique voters' structure. The future, the Electorate's Economic Voting Behavior can return to the normal or not,depending on the social cleavage line which is Cross-Strait Relations or economic and livelihood issues in Taiwan.

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What this paper is about

Economic voting theory suggests that the incumbent's economic performance determining electoral behavior, in other words, voters who think that the incumbent should take responsibility for the poor economic performance, or assess the future economy is pessimistic, will vote for the opposition political party in order to punish the ruling party; on the contrary, they will continue to support the ruling party. Although Taiwan's election is to adopt the West's electoral system, the electorate's economic voting behavior (including retrospective voting and prospective voting) are showed strong heterogeneity in the Taiwan area leader's elections since 1996. This phenomenon is closely related to Taiwan's special political ecology and the unique voters' structure. The future, the Electorate's Economic Voting Behavior can return to the normal or not,depending on the social cleavage line which is Cross-Strait Relations or economic and livelihood issues in Taiwan.

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Available abstract

Economic voting theory suggests that the incumbent's economic performance determining electoral behavior, in other words, voters who think that the incumbent should take responsibility for the poor economic performance, or assess the future economy is pessimistic, will vote for the opposition political party in order to punish the ruling party; on the contrary, they will continue to support the ruling party. Although Taiwan's election is to adopt the West's electoral system, the electorate's economic voting behavior (including retrospective voting and prospective voting) are showed strong heterogeneity in the Taiwan area leader's elections since 1996. This phenomenon is closely related to Taiwan's special political ecology and the unique voters' structure. The future, the Electorate's Economic Voting Behavior can return to the normal or not,depending on the social cleavage line which is Cross-Strait Relations or economic and livelihood issues in Taiwan.

Key concepts: Voting, Voting behavior, Opposition (politics), Political economy, Pessimism, Livelihood, Politics, Political science

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