Model and Analysis of Collusion between the Auction Agent and Corruptive Bidder in Multi-dimensional Auction
Yuanyuan Wang
Abstract
Yuanyuan Wang
Abstract
In construction projects,where principals don't have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent's corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.
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In construction projects,where principals don't have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent's corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.
Key concepts: Collusion, Generalized second-price auction, Common value auction, Auction theory, Vickrey auction, Microeconomics, English auction, Revenue equivalence