2012Shuxue de shijian yu renshiRequires access

Model and Analysis of Collusion between the Auction Agent and Corruptive Bidder in Multi-dimensional Auction

Yuanyuan Wang

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

In construction projects,where principals don't have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent's corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

In construction projects,where principals don't have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent's corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

In construction projects,where principals don't have the ability to organize an auction,collusion between the auction agent and the collusive bidder frequently occur.Based on the theories of multi-dimensional auctions,this paper built the model of auction agent's corruptive behaviors.The optimal auction mechanism,equilibrium bride and probability of collusion were figured out.The research shows that,the higher the level of investigating, punishing and real quality realized by the bidder,the smaller the corruption probability. However,the number of bidders may stimulate corruption.

Key concepts: Collusion, Generalized second-price auction, Common value auction, Auction theory, Vickrey auction, Microeconomics, English auction, Revenue equivalence

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Model and Analysis of Collusion between the Auction Agent and Corruptive Bidder in Multi-dimensional Auction — Research Paper | ScholarLens