Does Government Audit Restrain Earnings Management
Shuan Pan
Abstract
Shuan Pan
Abstract
Based on a total sample of 68 state-owned listed companies published by National Audit Office,we aim to observe whether the government audit can effectively suppress the company's earnings management and further investigate the effect of government audit.The empirical results document that,compared with the pre-audit,our sample's earnings management decreases after government audit,and also mitigates compared to state-owned listed companies that are not audited.In conclusion,government audit restrains earnings management effectively.Our research helps the auditing theory and practice in this field,and provides a reference in corporate governance and folk audit mechanism.
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Based on a total sample of 68 state-owned listed companies published by National Audit Office,we aim to observe whether the government audit can effectively suppress the company's earnings management and further investigate the effect of government audit.The empirical results document that,compared with the pre-audit,our sample's earnings management decreases after government audit,and also mitigates compared to state-owned listed companies that are not audited.In conclusion,government audit restrains earnings management effectively.Our research helps the auditing theory and practice in this field,and provides a reference in corporate governance and folk audit mechanism.
Key concepts: Accounting, Audit, Business, Earnings management, Joint audit, Corporate governance, Audit evidence, Sample (material)