The Problem on the Wealth of Managers in the Listed Company and the Company Governance
Chen Gao-cai
Abstract
Chen Gao-cai
Abstract
How to govern the CEO,CFO and other senior managers in the listed companies is a key issue studied by the theoretic circle. The wealth of managers is not only a fixed outcome of bargaining process of compensation contract, but also a dynamic conflict affected by such factors as strategy actions, individual preferences, non-currency bonus etc. This paper tries to define the wealth of managers, study its factors, find out the standard of future wealth of managers, and describe these strategy actions, with which we suggest the co-relation between the wealth of managers in the listed company and company governance.
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How to govern the CEO,CFO and other senior managers in the listed companies is a key issue studied by the theoretic circle. The wealth of managers is not only a fixed outcome of bargaining process of compensation contract, but also a dynamic conflict affected by such factors as strategy actions, individual preferences, non-currency bonus etc. This paper tries to define the wealth of managers, study its factors, find out the standard of future wealth of managers, and describe these strategy actions, with which we suggest the co-relation between the wealth of managers in the listed company and company governance.
Key concepts: Corporate governance, Business, Currency, Relation (database), Compensation (psychology), Accounting, Process (computing), Outcome (game theory)