Skepticism in the Underdetermination Argument
Jianbo Cao
Abstract
Jianbo Cao
Abstract
The principle of underdetermination holds that evidence cannot definitively justify our knowledge in epistemological terms.This principle can generate skeptical arguments which constitute the major arguments of skepticism.From the theoretical hypotheses of the underdetermination argument,it can be argued that there are three schemes which can rebut skepticism.They are:(1) denying the inevitable connection between knowledge and justification,(2) claiming that a justification does not require sufficient evidence to justify,and(3) holding that we do have evidence to support our common propositions rather than skeptical assumptions.This paper argues that all these schemes have drawbacks and that contextualism is a better approach.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
The principle of underdetermination holds that evidence cannot definitively justify our knowledge in epistemological terms.This principle can generate skeptical arguments which constitute the major arguments of skepticism.From the theoretical hypotheses of the underdetermination argument,it can be argued that there are three schemes which can rebut skepticism.They are:(1) denying the inevitable connection between knowledge and justification,(2) claiming that a justification does not require sufficient evidence to justify,and(3) holding that we do have evidence to support our common propositions rather than skeptical assumptions.This paper argues that all these schemes have drawbacks and that contextualism is a better approach.
Key concepts: Underdetermination, Skepticism, Epistemology, Argument (complex analysis), Philosophy, Contextualism, Philosophy of science, Medicine