The Soviet BTR on the Modern European Battlefield: Does It Have a Place in the U.S. Army's Light Infantry?

The U.S. Army created a new type division in 1983. Christened "light infantry", it was to be different from the regular infantry in the force structure at that time. The new light infantry was designed to be deployable and was to fight across the entire spectrum of war; low-, mid-, and high-intensity. To do this it was to be mobile, versatile, and lethal in addition to being deployable. The decision to utilize the light infantry early in a high-intensity conflict in Europe creates problems with retaining these characteristics. The purpose of this monograph is to show how the addition of a wheeled infantry carrier to the U.S. Army's light infantry would create a more capable force. This is especially important if the light infantry is expected to fight and win in a high-intensity conflict on the European continent. This paper first looks at the importance of infantry tactical mobility. It touches on the evolution of mechanization in the Soviet and U.S. armies. It then examines the light infantry as it is currently organized and equipped. The examination focuses on the light infantry's roles and capabilities in a high-intensity conflict in Europe and proposes that a wheeled carrier be added to the light infantry force structure. The paper then evaluates the Soviet BTR as the candidate for becoming the light infantry's wheeled carrier. An evaluation is then made to see how the BTR will affect the light infantry in the areas of mobility, versatility, lethality, and deployability. Once this is done, the light infantry is re-evaluated to see how it might perform in a high-intensity conflict in Europe with the BTR added to its force structure. The conclusions show that the BTR is a capable vehicle which produces positive effects on mobility, versatility, and lethality when added to the light infantry. However, the deployability of the unit is affected negatively. Even so, the paper concludes that the light infantry would be a more capable force in a high-intensity conflict in Europe with the addition of a wheeled carrier. As such, the paper recommends that some number of light infantry divisions be converted to motorized divisions.