Impacts of Executive Control on Senior Managers′ Compensation: Empirical Study of Listed Companies Offering Annual Salary Scheme
MA Chun-ai
Abstract
MA Chun-ai
Abstract
A test is conducted on the applicability of executive control approach in drafting senior managers′ compensation scheme, taking the data of 155 listed companies from 2002 to 2003 as samples. It is found that executive control has no effect on senior managers′ annual salary. Neither does ownership structure. Instead, the previons year′s salary is in effect, when deciding to increase or decrease annual salary, change in the return on equity(ROE) is often regarded as the main criterion. Independent directors can keep annual salary′s irrational change within limits.
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A test is conducted on the applicability of executive control approach in drafting senior managers′ compensation scheme, taking the data of 155 listed companies from 2002 to 2003 as samples. It is found that executive control has no effect on senior managers′ annual salary. Neither does ownership structure. Instead, the previons year′s salary is in effect, when deciding to increase or decrease annual salary, change in the return on equity(ROE) is often regarded as the main criterion. Independent directors can keep annual salary′s irrational change within limits.
Key concepts: Salary, Accounting, Executive compensation, Equity (law), Business, Control (management), Empirical research, Compensation (psychology)