2006•Caijing lilun yu shijianRequires access

A Discusion about the Shareholders ' Right Allocation

Liu Ding-hua

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Abstract

The fact that shareholders' right are absolutized as the right of property leads to the case that the whole shareholders' right are absolutely controlled by the main shareholders.For middle and small shareholders;two the right as consignor and the right as consignor have separated completely,while for holding shareholders;the two rights have not separated so far as to combine the two rights together again.On this background,the shareholder's right seems to be scattered.But in fact,they are even more centralized.Especially the share-profit right of the middle and small shareholders has been limited by the institution.The western corporate governance theory based on principal-agent is limited in resolving the problems of Chinese corporate governance. In fact,the corporate governance is aim to achieve an equilibrium between the shareholders' right by allocating the shareholder's right,to realize the corporate governance target.

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What this paper is about

The fact that shareholders' right are absolutized as the right of property leads to the case that the whole shareholders' right are absolutely controlled by the main shareholders.For middle and small shareholders;two the right as consignor and the right as consignor have separated completely,while for holding shareholders;the two rights have not separated so far as to combine the two rights together again.On this background,the shareholder's right seems to be scattered.But in fact,they are even more centralized.Especially the share-profit right of the middle and small shareholders has been limited by the institution.The western corporate governance theory based on principal-agent is limited in resolving the problems of Chinese corporate governance. In fact,the corporate governance is aim to achieve an equilibrium between the shareholders' right by allocating the shareholder's right,to realize the corporate governance target.

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Available abstract

The fact that shareholders' right are absolutized as the right of property leads to the case that the whole shareholders' right are absolutely controlled by the main shareholders.For middle and small shareholders;two the right as consignor and the right as consignor have separated completely,while for holding shareholders;the two rights have not separated so far as to combine the two rights together again.On this background,the shareholder's right seems to be scattered.But in fact,they are even more centralized.Especially the share-profit right of the middle and small shareholders has been limited by the institution.The western corporate governance theory based on principal-agent is limited in resolving the problems of Chinese corporate governance. In fact,the corporate governance is aim to achieve an equilibrium between the shareholders' right by allocating the shareholder's right,to realize the corporate governance target.

Key concepts: Shareholder, Corporate governance, Shareholder resolution, Business, Accounting, Profit (economics), Economics, Finance

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