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2014•Value EngineeringRequires access

Analysis of the Construction Contract Risk Caused by Information Asymmetry

Le Xu

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Abstract

Based on the asymmetric information theory, this paper focused on forms, causes, and consequences of the insufficient information phenomenon of the owner in the risk management of construction contract, and pointed out the universality and inevitability of the information asymmetry, put forward a lot of specific measures which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and restrain the adverse selection and the moral hazard fundamentally from the perspective of the owner.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Based on the asymmetric information theory, this paper focused on forms, causes, and consequences of the insufficient information phenomenon of the owner in the risk management of construction contract, and pointed out the universality and inevitability of the information asymmetry, put forward a lot of specific measures which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and restrain the adverse selection and the moral hazard fundamentally from the perspective of the owner.

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Available abstract

Based on the asymmetric information theory, this paper focused on forms, causes, and consequences of the insufficient information phenomenon of the owner in the risk management of construction contract, and pointed out the universality and inevitability of the information asymmetry, put forward a lot of specific measures which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and restrain the adverse selection and the moral hazard fundamentally from the perspective of the owner.

Key concepts: Adverse selection, Information asymmetry, Moral hazard, Phenomenon, Risk management, Universality (dynamical systems), Contract theory, Risk analysis (engineering)

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