Model of Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract of Independent Directors Considering Reputation Mechanism and its Application
Huiping Liu
Abstract
Huiping Liu
Abstract
Based on reputation theory and contract theory,a model of optimal dynamic incentive contract of independent directors is established,which is combined reputation incentive mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism,thus obtaining optimal conditions and ways to enhancing reputation incentive effect.It's advantages are testified in comparison with non-introduction of reputation incentive mechanism.Lastly,empirical analyses about its application are carried out and suggestions are correspondingly made.
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Based on reputation theory and contract theory,a model of optimal dynamic incentive contract of independent directors is established,which is combined reputation incentive mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism,thus obtaining optimal conditions and ways to enhancing reputation incentive effect.It's advantages are testified in comparison with non-introduction of reputation incentive mechanism.Lastly,empirical analyses about its application are carried out and suggestions are correspondingly made.
Key concepts: Reputation, Incentive, Mechanism (biology), Microeconomics, Contract theory, Business, Industrial organization, Economics