2012•The Journal of Financial ResearchRequires access

Do Minority Shareholders Only Act as“Free Rider”? Evidence from Public Shareholders Online Voting of Shenzhen Stock Exchange

Xing Jingpin

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Abstract

Based on the data of public shareholders online voting of Shenzhen Stock Exchange,we study the determinants and economic consequence of minority shareholders' participation in online voting and corporate decision. The results show that the more severe agency problem of controlling shareholder and the higher institutional shareholders' ownership,the more actively minority shareholders participate in online voting.We also find that the participation of minority shareholders in online voting is positively associated with abnormal return,and the relation is strengthened with the agency problem of controlling shareholder.Regarding the proposal of split-share reform that is most related to the interest of minority shareholders,they are more likely to execute online voting right,which gready improve the wealth of minority shareholders.

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What this paper is about

Based on the data of public shareholders online voting of Shenzhen Stock Exchange,we study the determinants and economic consequence of minority shareholders' participation in online voting and corporate decision. The results show that the more severe agency problem of controlling shareholder and the higher institutional shareholders' ownership,the more actively minority shareholders participate in online voting.We also find that the participation of minority shareholders in online voting is positively associated with abnormal return,and the relation is strengthened with the agency problem of controlling shareholder.Regarding the proposal of split-share reform that is most related to the interest of minority shareholders,they are more likely to execute online voting right,which gready improve the wealth of minority shareholders.

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Available abstract

Based on the data of public shareholders online voting of Shenzhen Stock Exchange,we study the determinants and economic consequence of minority shareholders' participation in online voting and corporate decision. The results show that the more severe agency problem of controlling shareholder and the higher institutional shareholders' ownership,the more actively minority shareholders participate in online voting.We also find that the participation of minority shareholders in online voting is positively associated with abnormal return,and the relation is strengthened with the agency problem of controlling shareholder.Regarding the proposal of split-share reform that is most related to the interest of minority shareholders,they are more likely to execute online voting right,which gready improve the wealth of minority shareholders.

Key concepts: Shareholder, Voting, Business, Stock exchange, Agency cost, Accounting, Agency (philosophy), Finance

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