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The typical corporate governance models in the West and the inspiration for the state-owned enterprise reform in China

Wei Yang

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Abstract

The Western corporate governance model has formed a perfect system through the development of several hundred years. The research on the Western corporate governance can improve China′s state owned enterprises(SOEs) governance. By analyzing and comparing the two typical corporate governance models in the West American and German, and combining with China′s national conditions and the drawbacks of SOEs governance, this paper puts forward a new corporate governance model. In this model, bank becomes the basis of external corporate governance by way of contingent governance mechanism, and the internal corporate governance uses co governance model to ensure that the stakeholders and stockholders can have equal chance to enter the governing board and supervisory board. The new corporate governance model absorbs the merits of the two typical models in the West and is close to the German model. And this model is fitter for the real need of China′s SOEs reform than the current governance model.

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What this paper is about

The Western corporate governance model has formed a perfect system through the development of several hundred years. The research on the Western corporate governance can improve China′s state owned enterprises(SOEs) governance. By analyzing and comparing the two typical corporate governance models in the West American and German, and combining with China′s national conditions and the drawbacks of SOEs governance, this paper puts forward a new corporate governance model. In this model, bank becomes the basis of external corporate governance by way of contingent governance mechanism, and the internal corporate governance uses co governance model to ensure that the stakeholders and stockholders can have equal chance to enter the governing board and supervisory board. The new corporate governance model absorbs the merits of the two typical models in the West and is close to the German model. And this model is fitter for the real need of China′s SOEs reform than the current governance model.

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Available abstract

The Western corporate governance model has formed a perfect system through the development of several hundred years. The research on the Western corporate governance can improve China′s state owned enterprises(SOEs) governance. By analyzing and comparing the two typical corporate governance models in the West American and German, and combining with China′s national conditions and the drawbacks of SOEs governance, this paper puts forward a new corporate governance model. In this model, bank becomes the basis of external corporate governance by way of contingent governance mechanism, and the internal corporate governance uses co governance model to ensure that the stakeholders and stockholders can have equal chance to enter the governing board and supervisory board. The new corporate governance model absorbs the merits of the two typical models in the West and is close to the German model. And this model is fitter for the real need of China′s SOEs reform than the current governance model.

Key concepts: Corporate governance, China, German, Business, Accounting, Project governance, German model, Shareholder

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