2012Logistics Engineering and ManagementRequires access

Dual Price-Three Sides Dynamic Game of Real Estate Market Based on Complete but Imperfect Information

Yang Da-wei

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Abstract

In recent years,the high price of China's real estate market attracts high attention.The dual price-three sides dynamic game model based on complete but imperfect information,using Bayesian Rule and Backward Induction to analyze the strategies of each side and find out the equilibrium of this game.Estate purchasers base their decision on their judgment of the market information and prospect.The government plays a critical rule in this game,its attitudes and policies have a direct effect on both buyers and sellers.

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In recent years,the high price of China's real estate market attracts high attention.The dual price-three sides dynamic game model based on complete but imperfect information,using Bayesian Rule and Backward Induction to analyze the strategies of each side and find out the equilibrium of this game.Estate purchasers base their decision on their judgment of the market information and prospect.The government plays a critical rule in this game,its attitudes and policies have a direct effect on both buyers and sellers.

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Available abstract

In recent years,the high price of China's real estate market attracts high attention.The dual price-three sides dynamic game model based on complete but imperfect information,using Bayesian Rule and Backward Induction to analyze the strategies of each side and find out the equilibrium of this game.Estate purchasers base their decision on their judgment of the market information and prospect.The government plays a critical rule in this game,its attitudes and policies have a direct effect on both buyers and sellers.

Key concepts: Perfect information, Bayesian game, Dual (grammatical number), Sequential game, Imperfect, Real estate, Microeconomics, Economics

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