Study of Government Subsidy Strategy under the Enterprise's Cooperation and Non-cooperation Parallel R&D Pattern
Tong Chen
Abstract
Tong Chen
Abstract
Concerning the cooperation and non-cooperation parallel RD pattern in the process of enterprise innovation,this article constructs a three-stage game model to analyze the influence of government subsidy pattern on the parallel RD pattern.Through contrastive analysis of the RD investment,output,profit,subsidy rate and social welfare of the subsidy in cooperation RD and non-cooperation RD,we find that the output,profit and social welfare are higher with government subsidy in non-cooperation RD;correspondingly,the subsidy rate is lower.The results indicate that performance of the government's subsidy in non-cooperation RD is higher.
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Concerning the cooperation and non-cooperation parallel RD pattern in the process of enterprise innovation,this article constructs a three-stage game model to analyze the influence of government subsidy pattern on the parallel RD pattern.Through contrastive analysis of the RD investment,output,profit,subsidy rate and social welfare of the subsidy in cooperation RD and non-cooperation RD,we find that the output,profit and social welfare are higher with government subsidy in non-cooperation RD;correspondingly,the subsidy rate is lower.The results indicate that performance of the government's subsidy in non-cooperation RD is higher.
Key concepts: Subsidy, Social Welfare, Profit (economics), Government (linguistics), Welfare, Microeconomics, Investment (military), Business