Stability Studies of Ecological Industry Chain Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Zhou Tiantia
Abstract
Zhou Tiantia
Abstract
Due to upper middle enterprises,downstream enterprises of the ecological industry chain and the government having the asymmetry of information,as well as companies seeking to maximize interests and the main performance of the government to supervise and guide,there is a game between enterprises( upper middle and downstream enterprises) and government behaviors. In this paper, with the upstream and downstream enterprises and government as the main body in the game and based on bounded rationality and limited information hypothesis,we establish evolutionary game model of tripartite cooperation relationship and replicated dynamic equation, and analyze its evolutionary stable strategy and the main influence factors. The results showed that the long-term equilibrium of the upstream enterprises' stable strategies are mainly affected by the game subject paying for technical improvement and waste disposal costs, the pay of by-product from the downstream enterprises wanting to purchase and the extent of governments' rewards or punishments; downstream enterprises are mainly affected by technical renovation costs and government's rewards or punishments; if under the condition that the government's regulation is strong,upstream and downstream enterprises are inclined to adopt the cooperation strategy. In order to achieve the cooperation between enterprises and government's stable regulation are in equilibrium state,we give the relevant policy recommendations finally.
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Due to upper middle enterprises,downstream enterprises of the ecological industry chain and the government having the asymmetry of information,as well as companies seeking to maximize interests and the main performance of the government to supervise and guide,there is a game between enterprises( upper middle and downstream enterprises) and government behaviors. In this paper, with the upstream and downstream enterprises and government as the main body in the game and based on bounded rationality and limited information hypothesis,we establish evolutionary game model of tripartite cooperation relationship and replicated dynamic equation, and analyze its evolutionary stable strategy and the main influence factors. The results showed that the long-term equilibrium of the upstream enterprises' stable strategies are mainly affected by the game subject paying for technical improvement and waste disposal costs, the pay of by-product from the downstream enterprises wanting to purchase and the extent of governments' rewards or punishments; downstream enterprises are mainly affected by technical renovation costs and government's rewards or punishments; if under the condition that the government's regulation is strong,upstream and downstream enterprises are inclined to adopt the cooperation strategy. In order to achieve the cooperation between enterprises and government's stable regulation are in equilibrium state,we give the relevant policy recommendations finally.
Key concepts: Downstream (manufacturing), Upstream (networking), Government (linguistics), Evolutionarily stable strategy, Industrial organization, Business, Upstream and downstream (DNA), Order (exchange)