2006•Journal of Yangtze UniversityRequires access

A Model for Two-dimensional Stackelberg Game with Incomplete Information and Its Equilibrium

Jie Hu

Abstract

Two-dimensional Stackelberg game model within complete information for two kinds of products with certain substitutions between two enterprises and its refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium are discussed and the relations of the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium in two dimensional Stackelberg game with two refined Bayesian Nash equilibriums in independental Stackelberg game on tow kinds of products are analyzed further.The analyzed results show that one-dimensional game and its equilibriums are special cases of multi-dimensional game and its equilibrium.

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Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Bayesian game, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Complete information, Best response, Extensive-form game, Sequential equilibrium