Research on Governance Effects of Debt Financing in the Perspective of Contract Theory
WU Qiu-shen
Abstract
WU Qiu-shen
Abstract
This paper builds multiple regression models to study the corporate governance effects of debts using Chinese listed companies' data.The empirical result shows that corporate debt financing has no motivational and constraining impacts on management,cannot reduce the agency costs or improve corporation's performance.In other words,debt financing does not exert its proper governance effects.
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This paper builds multiple regression models to study the corporate governance effects of debts using Chinese listed companies' data.The empirical result shows that corporate debt financing has no motivational and constraining impacts on management,cannot reduce the agency costs or improve corporation's performance.In other words,debt financing does not exert its proper governance effects.
Key concepts: Corporate governance, Debt, Debt financing, Agency cost, Business, Principal–agent problem, Finance, Corporation