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2011•Journal of Hubei University of TechnologyRequires access

Evolutionary Game Analysis between Pollutants Discharge Enterprises and Supervision Departments

Xiuming Dong

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Abstract

For overproof behavior of enterprises discharging pollutants,an evolutionary game model is constructed between bounded rational pollutants discharge enterprises and supervision departments.By analyzing the duplicative dynamic equations,evolutionary stable strategies(ESS)of the game is obtained and how attendants' behavior influence ESS is discussed.Finally,the reasons of enterprises' pollutants discharge behavior are analysed and some reasonable suggestions are offered.

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What this paper is about

For overproof behavior of enterprises discharging pollutants,an evolutionary game model is constructed between bounded rational pollutants discharge enterprises and supervision departments.By analyzing the duplicative dynamic equations,evolutionary stable strategies(ESS)of the game is obtained and how attendants' behavior influence ESS is discussed.Finally,the reasons of enterprises' pollutants discharge behavior are analysed and some reasonable suggestions are offered.

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Available abstract

For overproof behavior of enterprises discharging pollutants,an evolutionary game model is constructed between bounded rational pollutants discharge enterprises and supervision departments.By analyzing the duplicative dynamic equations,evolutionary stable strategies(ESS)of the game is obtained and how attendants' behavior influence ESS is discussed.Finally,the reasons of enterprises' pollutants discharge behavior are analysed and some reasonable suggestions are offered.

Key concepts: Pollutant, Bounded rationality, Evolutionarily stable strategy, Evolutionary game theory, Game theory, Business, Environmental economics, Microeconomics

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