Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Relationships among Enterprises in Eco-Industrial Chain
Zhiying Wang
Abstract
Zhiying Wang
Abstract
Aiming at the current situation that the asymmetry of information possessed by producer enterprise,consumer enterprise and decomposer enterprise in eco-industrial chain and the pursuit of maximizing their own benefits cause the long-term continuous game among various enterprises,taking the three kinds of enterprise groups as game subjects,and under their bounded rationality and limited information hypotheses,the evolutionary game model and the replicated dynamic equation about their cooperative relationships are established in this paper.The evolutionary stable strategies and the evolutionary influence factors are investigated.The results indicate that the long-term equilibrium of enterprise groups is influenced by the initial state of game occurring and the discount factors constituting the payoff of game subjects,the total excess profit as well as initial costs for cooperation paid by various enterprises.On this basis,the evolutionary process of cooperative relationships on enterprises in Kalun-borg Eco-industrial Park is examined and the correctness of the above analysis is verified.
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Aiming at the current situation that the asymmetry of information possessed by producer enterprise,consumer enterprise and decomposer enterprise in eco-industrial chain and the pursuit of maximizing their own benefits cause the long-term continuous game among various enterprises,taking the three kinds of enterprise groups as game subjects,and under their bounded rationality and limited information hypotheses,the evolutionary game model and the replicated dynamic equation about their cooperative relationships are established in this paper.The evolutionary stable strategies and the evolutionary influence factors are investigated.The results indicate that the long-term equilibrium of enterprise groups is influenced by the initial state of game occurring and the discount factors constituting the payoff of game subjects,the total excess profit as well as initial costs for cooperation paid by various enterprises.On this basis,the evolutionary process of cooperative relationships on enterprises in Kalun-borg Eco-industrial Park is examined and the correctness of the above analysis is verified.
Key concepts: Correctness, Evolutionarily stable strategy, Profit (economics), Bounded rationality, Industrial organization, Evolutionary game theory, Strategy, Game theory