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Research on the Compensation Contract Model for State-owned Enterprises′ Operator

Guomin Zhang

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Abstract

Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.

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What this paper is about

Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.

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Available abstract

Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.

Key concepts: Incentive, Corporation, Corporate governance, State owned, Business, Compensation (psychology), China, State (computer science)

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