Nash and Stackelberg Equilibrium Points in Constrained Minimization and Games
F. Mignanego, G. Pieri
Abstract
F. Mignanego, G. Pieri
Abstract
We are concerned with the following problem: “Two agents Cor players) want to minimize their own costfunctionals with some constraints on decision variables“. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are considered and different situations arising in the research of sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in the two cases are studied.Applications of those results to a class of differential games and to incentive strategies theory are showed.
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We are concerned with the following problem: “Two agents Cor players) want to minimize their own costfunctionals with some constraints on decision variables“. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are considered and different situations arising in the research of sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in the two cases are studied.Applications of those results to a class of differential games and to incentive strategies theory are showed.
Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Class (philosophy), Best response, Epsilon-equilibrium, Correlated equilibrium, Mathematical optimization