Legtsla tie-Administrative Interaction
Marcus E. Ethridge
Abstract
Marcus E. Ethridge
Abstract
NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL mechanisms have been recently adopted on the state level which indicate that legislative participation in implementation is entering a period of considerable development and expansion. A resurgence of anti-regulatory fervor has prompted legislators to enact statutes giving committees authority to suspend or annul administrative regulations.' Similar proposals are being considered on the federal level as well. Perhaps most notably, Congress has recently enacted provisions granting appropriate committees authority to veto any future regulations of the Federal Trade Commission. The justification for these enactments is usually based on rather simple notions of the legislative role in policy-making, such as Herbert Simon's idea that it should ensure administrative responsiveness to community values.2 Although this kind of argument can hardly be opposed in the abstract, it does not appear that the legislative function of keeping administrative decisions in line with democratically derived citizen preferences justifies all forms of legislative participation with equal validity. The emergence of new mechanisms for review of administrative regulations suggests that,
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NEW AND CONTROVERSIAL mechanisms have been recently adopted on the state level which indicate that legislative participation in implementation is entering a period of considerable development and expansion. A resurgence of anti-regulatory fervor has prompted legislators to enact statutes giving committees authority to suspend or annul administrative regulations.' Similar proposals are being considered on the federal level as well. Perhaps most notably, Congress has recently enacted provisions granting appropriate committees authority to veto any future regulations of the Federal Trade Commission. The justification for these enactments is usually based on rather simple notions of the legislative role in policy-making, such as Herbert Simon's idea that it should ensure administrative responsiveness to community values.2 Although this kind of argument can hardly be opposed in the abstract, it does not appear that the legislative function of keeping administrative decisions in line with democratically derived citizen preferences justifies all forms of legislative participation with equal validity. The emergence of new mechanisms for review of administrative regulations suggests that,
Key concepts: Legislature, Statute, Veto, Political science, Public administration, Commission, State (computer science), Argument (complex analysis)