“Private Property Rights and Public Responsibility: Leaving Room for the Homeless”
Sarah E. Hamill
Abstract
Open-access reader
Sarah E. Hamill
Abstract
Open-access reader
This paper uses the recent case of Victoria (City) v Adams to examine how Canadian law guarantees or restricts access to publicly accessible property. The paper argues that the understanding and view of property in Adams is in keeping with the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on publicly accessible property. By comparing public property with private property, the paper argues that in Canada all property is seen as private property and is protected as such. The paper argues that the current understanding of property is unacceptable because it leaves no room for those who have no private property rights. It looks at other models of property to see if they leave room for those with no property of their own. The paper then moves on to argue that the common law, despite understanding all property as private, leaves room for those who have no property of their own. This feature of the common law of property has often been overlooked, however, resulting in laws that are unworkable and unacceptable.
OpenAlex reports 2 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This paper uses the recent case of Victoria (City) v Adams to examine how Canadian law guarantees or restricts access to publicly accessible property. The paper argues that the understanding and view of property in Adams is in keeping with the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on publicly accessible property. By comparing public property with private property, the paper argues that in Canada all property is seen as private property and is protected as such. The paper argues that the current understanding of property is unacceptable because it leaves no room for those who have no private property rights. It looks at other models of property to see if they leave room for those with no property of their own. The paper then moves on to argue that the common law, despite understanding all property as private, leaves room for those who have no property of their own. This feature of the common law of property has often been overlooked, however, resulting in laws that are unworkable and unacceptable.
Key concepts: Public property, Private property, Property (philosophy), Property law, Numerus clausus, Jurisprudence, Property rights, Supreme court