2013Unpublished venueOpen access

Safeguards Approaches for Very Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel

Lenka Kollar, USDOE, Adrián Méndez-Torres, H. Diaz Marcano, Ike Therios

Open full text 0 citations

Abstract

Many States are considering interim very long-term storage (VLTS) strategies for spent fuel storage while final disposition options are developed. Under the VLTS approach, spent fuel will be stored for periods that could exceed 50 to 100 years. The long-term storage of spent fuel — and the increasing stockpile of plutonium contained in this spent fuel — exacerbate the international safeguards and verification needs for spent fuel. In particular, significant delays in any verification of the contents of spent fuel assemblies prior to disposition may cause even further delays in the final disposition (or reprocessing) of spent fuel. As a result, the resources required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the increasing stockpile of spent fuel will increase. Safeguarding these interim storage facilities and subsequently, the transportation of long-term stored fuel, will place additional demands on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, is to be continued. Current IAEA approaches to safeguarding above ground dry storage sites do not take into account the challenges associated with longer-term storage and are also very dependent on inspector presence. The IAEA is moving toward remote and unattended monitoring systems for safeguards and these systems should be utilized at VLTS facilities as much as possible. The research and development of various monitoring systems should be continued.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Many States are considering interim very long-term storage (VLTS) strategies for spent fuel storage while final disposition options are developed. Under the VLTS approach, spent fuel will be stored for periods that could exceed 50 to 100 years. The long-term storage of spent fuel — and the increasing stockpile of plutonium contained in this spent fuel — exacerbate the international safeguards and verification needs for spent fuel. In particular, significant delays in any verification of the contents of spent fuel assemblies prior to disposition may cause even further delays in the final disposition (or reprocessing) of spent fuel. As a result, the resources required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the increasing stockpile of spent fuel will increase. Safeguarding these interim storage facilities and subsequently, the transportation of long-term stored fuel, will place additional demands on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, is to be continued. Current IAEA approaches to safeguarding above ground dry storage sites do not take into account the challenges associated with longer-term storage and are also very dependent on inspector presence. The IAEA is moving toward remote and unattended monitoring systems for safeguards and these systems should be utilized at VLTS facilities as much as possible. The research and development of various monitoring systems should be continued.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Many States are considering interim very long-term storage (VLTS) strategies for spent fuel storage while final disposition options are developed. Under the VLTS approach, spent fuel will be stored for periods that could exceed 50 to 100 years. The long-term storage of spent fuel — and the increasing stockpile of plutonium contained in this spent fuel — exacerbate the international safeguards and verification needs for spent fuel. In particular, significant delays in any verification of the contents of spent fuel assemblies prior to disposition may cause even further delays in the final disposition (or reprocessing) of spent fuel. As a result, the resources required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard the increasing stockpile of spent fuel will increase. Safeguarding these interim storage facilities and subsequently, the transportation of long-term stored fuel, will place additional demands on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, is to be continued. Current IAEA approaches to safeguarding above ground dry storage sites do not take into account the challenges associated with longer-term storage and are also very dependent on inspector presence. The IAEA is moving toward remote and unattended monitoring systems for safeguards and these systems should be utilized at VLTS facilities as much as possible. The research and development of various monitoring systems should be continued.

Key concepts: Nuclide, Criticality, Burnup, Nuclear engineering, Fission products, Environmental science, Spent nuclear fuel, Radionuclide

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Safeguards Approaches for Very Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel — Research Paper | ScholarLens