Human Rights Protection before the International Criminal Court
Alex Davidson
Abstract
Alex Davidson
Abstract
This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.
OpenAlex reports 2 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.
Key concepts: Principle of legality, Human rights, Law, Statute, Public international law, International human rights law, Political science, International law