2016•International Community Law ReviewRequires access

Human Rights Protection before the International Criminal Court

Alex Davidson

Open publisher page 2 citations

Abstract

This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.

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What this paper is about

This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.

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Available abstract

This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.

Key concepts: Principle of legality, Human rights, Law, Statute, Public international law, International human rights law, Political science, International law

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