A Joint Forces Group: A Permanent Joint Echelon for the Operational Level of War
Edward V. Weber
Abstract
Edward V. Weber
Abstract
This paper investigates creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war called the Joint Forces Group. The paper is broken down into four chapters. The first, describes current joint doctrine on how the U.S. military organizes for war. The second, investigates the function of command and the development of modern military formations. The third, analyzes JTF operations and exercises from 1983 to 1994. The last chapter introduces the Joint Forces Group concept. The paper discusses the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. All three are essential to successfully prosecuting military operations. The requirement to link the strategic endstate and tactical means makes the operational level unique. Although, a CINC can do this, but he then operates at the operational level. The operational level is also unique because it relies on an ad hoc command structure to carry-out military operations; the Joint Task Force (JTF). History suggests that ad hoc structures are not the best way to employ military forces. Command is accomplished by a commander and his staff; they are a team that plans the way the mission is accomplished. Developing an effective team requires organizational stability, best achieved in permanent organizations. The development of modern military formations also suggests that permanent organizations are better than improvised ones. Specialization of arms led to the development of combined arms to provide the great flexibility. Service components represent the pinnacle of specialization of tactical forces; there is a need to better orchestrate these components. A review of JTF operations and exercises showed there were problems with planning attributable, in part, to an ad hoc headquarters. This did not lead to defeat or mission failure because the tasks were relatively simple and the enemy, in combat operations, was inferior. There is no guarantee that this will remain so. There were occasional recommendations that a permanent echelon would have been beneficial. The solution to those recommendations is the Joint Forces Group echelon. The JFG will be a deployable, permanent joint headquarters that can more effectively orchestrate joint forces. The JFG is feasible by taking advantage of the joint specialty officer and other changes in joint warfighting. It will use a streamlined staff structure to economize on manning levels. It represents the next step in improving joint warfighting.
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This paper investigates creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war called the Joint Forces Group. The paper is broken down into four chapters. The first, describes current joint doctrine on how the U.S. military organizes for war. The second, investigates the function of command and the development of modern military formations. The third, analyzes JTF operations and exercises from 1983 to 1994. The last chapter introduces the Joint Forces Group concept. The paper discusses the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. All three are essential to successfully prosecuting military operations. The requirement to link the strategic endstate and tactical means makes the operational level unique. Although, a CINC can do this, but he then operates at the operational level. The operational level is also unique because it relies on an ad hoc command structure to carry-out military operations; the Joint Task Force (JTF). History suggests that ad hoc structures are not the best way to employ military forces. Command is accomplished by a commander and his staff; they are a team that plans the way the mission is accomplished. Developing an effective team requires organizational stability, best achieved in permanent organizations. The development of modern military formations also suggests that permanent organizations are better than improvised ones. Specialization of arms led to the development of combined arms to provide the great flexibility. Service components represent the pinnacle of specialization of tactical forces; there is a need to better orchestrate these components. A review of JTF operations and exercises showed there were problems with planning attributable, in part, to an ad hoc headquarters. This did not lead to defeat or mission failure because the tasks were relatively simple and the enemy, in combat operations, was inferior. There is no guarantee that this will remain so. There were occasional recommendations that a permanent echelon would have been beneficial. The solution to those recommendations is the Joint Forces Group echelon. The JFG will be a deployable, permanent joint headquarters that can more effectively orchestrate joint forces. The JFG is feasible by taking advantage of the joint specialty officer and other changes in joint warfighting. It will use a streamlined staff structure to economize on manning levels. It represents the next step in improving joint warfighting.
Key concepts: Joint (building), Group (periodic table), Computer science, Operations management, Operations research, Engineering, Structural engineering, Physics