Psychoanalysis as a natural science: Reconsidering Freud's “scientistic self-misunderstanding”
Siegfried Zepf
Abstract
Siegfried Zepf
Abstract
This paper centres on Habermas's judgement that when Freud assesses psychoanalysis as a natural science, this constitutes a scientific self-misunderstanding. The author discusses Brenner's conviction that Freud's view is not a misunderstanding but is true for psychoanalysis and rejects his conclusion. In the author's view, Freud's assessment of psychoanalysis must be seen as a misunderstanding whose basis lies in its subject. Unconscious figures assert themselves under the repetition compulsion in the same manner as natural laws, each of which asserts itself beyond individual consciousness. It was the discovery of the unconscious that led Freud to conceive of psychoanalysis as a natural science and it seems that this conception is rooted in the structural identity between unconscious and natural processes. Freud's misunderstanding of pseudo-nature as nature seems to be indebted to his energy concept. As it is impossible to deduce psychic energies and their distribution by means of the psychoanalytic method, this being dependent on language, the author recommends replacing the economic metapsychological viewpoint by an affective one. The author goes on further to discuss the object of psychoanalytic investigation, the psychoanalytic method used to acquire knowledge, and the function held by metapsychology.
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This paper centres on Habermas's judgement that when Freud assesses psychoanalysis as a natural science, this constitutes a scientific self-misunderstanding. The author discusses Brenner's conviction that Freud's view is not a misunderstanding but is true for psychoanalysis and rejects his conclusion. In the author's view, Freud's assessment of psychoanalysis must be seen as a misunderstanding whose basis lies in its subject. Unconscious figures assert themselves under the repetition compulsion in the same manner as natural laws, each of which asserts itself beyond individual consciousness. It was the discovery of the unconscious that led Freud to conceive of psychoanalysis as a natural science and it seems that this conception is rooted in the structural identity between unconscious and natural processes. Freud's misunderstanding of pseudo-nature as nature seems to be indebted to his energy concept. As it is impossible to deduce psychic energies and their distribution by means of the psychoanalytic method, this being dependent on language, the author recommends replacing the economic metapsychological viewpoint by an affective one. The author goes on further to discuss the object of psychoanalytic investigation, the psychoanalytic method used to acquire knowledge, and the function held by metapsychology.
Key concepts: Psychoanalytic theory, Unconscious mind, Metapsychology, Psychoanalysis, Natural (archaeology), Epistemology, Consciousness, Subject (documents)