1997Unpublished venueRequires access

Weapon System Safety: Bridging the GAP between Hardware and Software.

Michael Zemore

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

Abstract : System safety efforts for major weapon systems often provide for the early identification of hazards and the elimination or control of those hazards through system design. Although this process has been proven effective in providing safe and effective weapon systems, significant deficiencies exist when computer programs utilized within the system are not adequately addressed. With the influx of computer programs in today's weapon system designs, it is critical to emure computer program safety analysis is integrated into the system safety analysis process. With the proper analysis effort for all aspects of the system, and the proper integration of those efforts, a thorough identification and resolution of hazards will occur whether those hazards are induced by a failure mode, adverse environment, or computer program condition. This report addresses a system safety methodology and flow of safety-related information from system-related analyses to computer- program-related analyses. Specifically, the identification of safety-critical functions, analysis techniques, and the identification of potential hazards in computer programs are discussed. In addition, a method for accurately assessing risk associated with computer program hazards and documenting their relationship to system-level events is defined.

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Abstract : System safety efforts for major weapon systems often provide for the early identification of hazards and the elimination or control of those hazards through system design. Although this process has been proven effective in providing safe and effective weapon systems, significant deficiencies exist when computer programs utilized within the system are not adequately addressed. With the influx of computer programs in today's weapon system designs, it is critical to emure computer program safety analysis is integrated into the system safety analysis process. With the proper analysis effort for all aspects of the system, and the proper integration of those efforts, a thorough identification and resolution of hazards will occur whether those hazards are induced by a failure mode, adverse environment, or computer program condition. This report addresses a system safety methodology and flow of safety-related information from system-related analyses to computer- program-related analyses. Specifically, the identification of safety-critical functions, analysis techniques, and the identification of potential hazards in computer programs are discussed. In addition, a method for accurately assessing risk associated with computer program hazards and documenting their relationship to system-level events is defined.

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Available abstract

Abstract : System safety efforts for major weapon systems often provide for the early identification of hazards and the elimination or control of those hazards through system design. Although this process has been proven effective in providing safe and effective weapon systems, significant deficiencies exist when computer programs utilized within the system are not adequately addressed. With the influx of computer programs in today's weapon system designs, it is critical to emure computer program safety analysis is integrated into the system safety analysis process. With the proper analysis effort for all aspects of the system, and the proper integration of those efforts, a thorough identification and resolution of hazards will occur whether those hazards are induced by a failure mode, adverse environment, or computer program condition. This report addresses a system safety methodology and flow of safety-related information from system-related analyses to computer- program-related analyses. Specifically, the identification of safety-critical functions, analysis techniques, and the identification of potential hazards in computer programs are discussed. In addition, a method for accurately assessing risk associated with computer program hazards and documenting their relationship to system-level events is defined.

Key concepts: Identification (biology), Process (computing), System safety, Hazard analysis, Risk analysis (engineering), Computer science, Bridging (networking), Engineering

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