Recasting the Concept of Ideology: A Content Approach

Birnbaum lucidly noted over thirty years ago that Weber's 'concern with the independent effects of ideology on social development . . . originated in his polemical encounter with Marxism'.l A legacy of that encounter has been scholars' preoccupation with the social functions of ideology and a corresponding disregard of what ideology is. Hence, it is not surprising that the relevant sociological literature reveals a bias towards a functional definition2 of ideology and, conversely, a lack of concern for a definition based on, or even seriously related to, content. Despite some significant contributions in recent years, the sociological understanding of ideology, in particular the adequacy of its definition, has not recovered from that legacy. The argument of this paper is that there is greater benefit in having a definition of ideology, or of what it is to be ideological, which is based on the mode of believing and the content of beliefs rather than their social functions. I want to develop this argument by addressing three questions: (i) what is the problem with the sociology of ideology? (ii) what is the nature of a content approach to ideology and (iii) what are its advantages? Put differently, by clarifying and recasting that concept, I hope to provide, as Quine put it, 'a good sense to a bad word'.3