State Discretion and Medicaid Program Variation in Long-Term Care
Edward Miller
Abstract
Edward Miller
Abstract
Although federal statutes and regulations establish the broad parameters within which state Medicaid programs operate, the federal government grants states substantial discretion over Medicaid and Medicaid-funded long-term care. An appreciation of resulting cross-state variation in Medicaid program characteristics, however, has been lacking in the ongoing debate over whether the federal government should further devolve responsibility for caring for the poor and disabled elderly to the states. To better inform this discussion, therefore, this article documents considerable variation, not only in terms of Medicaid program spending and recipients, but also in terms of strategies chosen to reform long-term care services and financing. Since there is little doubt that states take full advantage of current levels of discretion, advocates of devolution may want to reassess their views to consider whether existing variation has resulted in inequities addressable only through more, not less, federal involvement.
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Although federal statutes and regulations establish the broad parameters within which state Medicaid programs operate, the federal government grants states substantial discretion over Medicaid and Medicaid-funded long-term care. An appreciation of resulting cross-state variation in Medicaid program characteristics, however, has been lacking in the ongoing debate over whether the federal government should further devolve responsibility for caring for the poor and disabled elderly to the states. To better inform this discussion, therefore, this article documents considerable variation, not only in terms of Medicaid program spending and recipients, but also in terms of strategies chosen to reform long-term care services and financing. Since there is little doubt that states take full advantage of current levels of discretion, advocates of devolution may want to reassess their views to consider whether existing variation has resulted in inequities addressable only through more, not less, federal involvement.
Key concepts: Medicaid, Statute, Discretion, Long-term care, Variation (astronomy), State (computer science), Administrative discretion, Government (linguistics)