Paradox, Ambiguity, and Enigma: The Strange Case of the Executive Budget and the United States Constitution

What has become of the executive budget? Drawn from European experience, it was a popular proposal at all levels of government in the United States at the beginning of the century, a keystone in a Progressive agenda of reform. Adopted at the federal level in 1921, it stood for 50 years or more as a dominant institution in national economic and fiscal policy making. But in the mid-1980s, the federal budget process is widely perceived as in a state of crisis, and the meaning and significance of the executive budget are open to question. Current confusions may often be traced to past misunderstandings and unfounded expectations. The place of the executive budget in the United States constitutional context has never really been clear, and the institution as adopted and developed differed from the initial proposal. The original concept espoused by budget reformers implied an executive budget monopoly, justified by a doctrine of administrative neutrality, at odds both with contemporary practice and the separation of powers. In this sense the executive budget was a paradox. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 modified this concept by retaining legislative initiative in appropriations and stressing the executive budget as a means of gaining executive responsibility and strengthening legislative budgetary control. Later the justification of policy-making capacity was added to that of administrative efficiency. In this sense, the executive budget was an integral part of the separation of powers, reflecting constitutional ambiguities regarding the place and limits of executive power, though these were overshadowed by acceptance of executive leadership. Presently, neither original nor later meaning appears accurate. Assertions of executive budget monopoly on grounds of administrative neutrality seem inapposite, but expectations of executive prerogative from the original concept linger. Responsibility, the foundation of the modified executive budget, also seems to have evaporated: the executive budget is now simply a bargaining counter in a complex game in which the legislature often takes the initiative and the executive adopts a reactive stance. The result is the opposite of in* The executive budget, drawn from European experience, was a keystone in the Progressive agenda of governmental reform at the beginning of the twentieth century. The original proposal, implying a virtual executive monopoly of the budget, appeared as a paradox in the United States constitutional context of separation of powers. A modified version, accepted in 1921, which retained legislative initiative in appropriations, however, became an accepted and integral element of the sharing of power between executive and legislative branches. Its legitimacy was justified by values of neutral competence, executive leadership, and responsibility in government. In recent years the ambiguities of the concept have come to the surface, and though the executive budget exists in form, its meaning and significance are open to question.