Directed Forgetting and Memory for Directions to a Destination
Jonathan M. Golding, Janice M. Keenan
Abstract
Jonathan M. Golding, Janice M. Keenan
Abstract
In an attempt to examine directed forgetting in a naturalistic context, we investigated the directed forgetting phenomenon in the context of giving directions to a destination. Three groups of subjects received a fictitious set of directions: (a) the control group received only the basic set of directions; (b) the remember group received an additional turn along with the basic directions; and (c) the forget group received the same directions as the remember group, but they were told to forget the additional piece of information. If directed forgetting occurs, the forget group should perform as well as the control group and better than the remember group. This result did not occur on either a recall test for the directions or a recognition test, although it did occur when subjects had to draw the route. The lack of directed forgetting is attributed to the fact when people are told Forget that in a naturalistic context, they often construe the information as wrong, label it as such, and continue to remember it so it can help them know by inference what is correct.
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In an attempt to examine directed forgetting in a naturalistic context, we investigated the directed forgetting phenomenon in the context of giving directions to a destination. Three groups of subjects received a fictitious set of directions: (a) the control group received only the basic set of directions; (b) the remember group received an additional turn along with the basic directions; and (c) the forget group received the same directions as the remember group, but they were told to forget the additional piece of information. If directed forgetting occurs, the forget group should perform as well as the control group and better than the remember group. This result did not occur on either a recall test for the directions or a recognition test, although it did occur when subjects had to draw the route. The lack of directed forgetting is attributed to the fact when people are told Forget that in a naturalistic context, they often construe the information as wrong, label it as such, and continue to remember it so it can help them know by inference what is correct.
Key concepts: Forgetting, Psychology, Cognitive psychology, Motivated forgetting, Cognitive science