1973•Southern Economic JournalRequires access

Economies of Scale and Holding Company Affiliation in Banking: Reply

Stuart A. Schweitzer

Open publisher page 10 citations

Abstract

The structure of our commercial banking system, while shaped to an extent by market forces, is in large part due to the complex of federal and state regulations governing banking firms. Among these are statutes making the applications of FDIC-insured banks for merger and for holding company affiliation subject to approval by a federal regulatory agency. These statutes, the Bank Merger Act of 1960 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, amended in 1966 and 1970, direct the agencies to consider the firms' prospects for financial viability, the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and the probable effect of the merger or holding company affiliation upon competition in affected banking markets. Approval is to be withheld for combinations whose effect may be to substantially lessen competition, unless it is clear that the public interest would nevertheless be served.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The structure of our commercial banking system, while shaped to an extent by market forces, is in large part due to the complex of federal and state regulations governing banking firms. Among these are statutes making the applications of FDIC-insured banks for merger and for holding company affiliation subject to approval by a federal regulatory agency. These statutes, the Bank Merger Act of 1960 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, amended in 1966 and 1970, direct the agencies to consider the firms' prospects for financial viability, the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and the probable effect of the merger or holding company affiliation upon competition in affected banking markets. Approval is to be withheld for combinations whose effect may be to substantially lessen competition, unless it is clear that the public interest would nevertheless be served.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 10 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The structure of our commercial banking system, while shaped to an extent by market forces, is in large part due to the complex of federal and state regulations governing banking firms. Among these are statutes making the applications of FDIC-insured banks for merger and for holding company affiliation subject to approval by a federal regulatory agency. These statutes, the Bank Merger Act of 1960 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, amended in 1966 and 1970, direct the agencies to consider the firms' prospects for financial viability, the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and the probable effect of the merger or holding company affiliation upon competition in affected banking markets. Approval is to be withheld for combinations whose effect may be to substantially lessen competition, unless it is clear that the public interest would nevertheless be served.

Key concepts: Scale (ratio), Economies of scale, Business, Economics, Financial system, Monetary economics, Microeconomics, Geography

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Economies of Scale and Holding Company Affiliation in Banking: Reply — Research Paper | ScholarLens