1958•The Philosophical ReviewRequires access

Justice as Fairness

John Rawls

Open publisher page 5,571 citations

Abstract

It might seem at first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same and that there is no reason to distinguish them or to say that one is more fundamental than the other. This chapter shows that the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness, and offers an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view. It argues that it is the aspect of justice for which utilitarianism, in its classical form, is unable to account, but which is expressed, even if misleadingly, by the idea of the social contract. The chapter develops a particular conception of justice by stating and commenting upon two principles which specify it and by considering the circumstances and conditions under which they may be thought to arise. It considers justice only as a virtue of social institutions, or what is called as practices.

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What this paper is about

It might seem at first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same and that there is no reason to distinguish them or to say that one is more fundamental than the other. This chapter shows that the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness, and offers an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view. It argues that it is the aspect of justice for which utilitarianism, in its classical form, is unable to account, but which is expressed, even if misleadingly, by the idea of the social contract. The chapter develops a particular conception of justice by stating and commenting upon two principles which specify it and by considering the circumstances and conditions under which they may be thought to arise. It considers justice only as a virtue of social institutions, or what is called as practices.

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Available abstract

It might seem at first sight that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same and that there is no reason to distinguish them or to say that one is more fundamental than the other. This chapter shows that the fundamental idea in the concept of justice is fairness, and offers an analysis of the concept of justice from this point of view. It argues that it is the aspect of justice for which utilitarianism, in its classical form, is unable to account, but which is expressed, even if misleadingly, by the idea of the social contract. The chapter develops a particular conception of justice by stating and commenting upon two principles which specify it and by considering the circumstances and conditions under which they may be thought to arise. It considers justice only as a virtue of social institutions, or what is called as practices.

Key concepts: Economic Justice, Law and economics, Utilitarianism, Sociology, Epistemology, Retributive justice, Virtue, Political science

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