If the Present were the Past
Matthew Dyson
Abstract
Matthew Dyson
Abstract
In his 1955 inaugural lecture as Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Cambridge,1 CJ Hamson suggested that the survival of legal history, and by implication comparative law, depended on it being thought of as part of every substantive area of law, rather than only as a separate discipline. Facing a decline in the subject’s appeal and the research done on it, this approach sought to protect its long-term future by ensuring that some of its content and reasoning were studied by all students. Today, legal history’s position is no more certain (though, one might hope, no less). There is much excellent legal history research being done, but student interest in the subject is hardly robust. Looking back at Hamson’s inaugural plan reminds us that there are some battles we have been fighting for a long time; some we might even be fighting forever. But are all things in legal history so constant? Are all legal actors doomed to rehearse the debates and repeat the tasks of their predecessors? Put another way, we might well wonder what future legal historians will think of us, our work, and our ideas today.
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In his 1955 inaugural lecture as Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Cambridge,1 CJ Hamson suggested that the survival of legal history, and by implication comparative law, depended on it being thought of as part of every substantive area of law, rather than only as a separate discipline. Facing a decline in the subject’s appeal and the research done on it, this approach sought to protect its long-term future by ensuring that some of its content and reasoning were studied by all students. Today, legal history’s position is no more certain (though, one might hope, no less). There is much excellent legal history research being done, but student interest in the subject is hardly robust. Looking back at Hamson’s inaugural plan reminds us that there are some battles we have been fighting for a long time; some we might even be fighting forever. But are all things in legal history so constant? Are all legal actors doomed to rehearse the debates and repeat the tasks of their predecessors? Put another way, we might well wonder what future legal historians will think of us, our work, and our ideas today.
Key concepts: Wonder, Subject (documents), Appeal, Law, Legal history, Sociology, Political science, Epistemology