1985•The Journal of Nervous and Mental DiseaseRequires access

Logical and Conceptual Problems of Existential Psychiatry

Charles M. T. Hanly

Open publisher page 5 citations

Abstract

The author has argued that existential psychology and psychiatry are not consistent with existential philosophy, from which they derive their basic concepts. Existential philosophy treats consciousness as an epistemic and ontological absolute while existential psychology and psychiatry acknowledge the existence of unconscious mental processes. It is not possible to base a viable concept of psychodynamic psychotherapy, the nature of transference, or the efficacy of interpretation upon the radical concept of freedom, which is basic to existential philosophy. If psychiatrists wish to experiment with nonpsychoanalytic dynamic psychologies, then it is the author's opinion that the advancement of knowledge would be better served either by using existentialist concepts and principles consistently or by explicitly altering them in clearly defined ways for stated reasons, or by formulating psychodynamic hypotheses that do not lay claim to any foundation in existential philosophy.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The author has argued that existential psychology and psychiatry are not consistent with existential philosophy, from which they derive their basic concepts. Existential philosophy treats consciousness as an epistemic and ontological absolute while existential psychology and psychiatry acknowledge the existence of unconscious mental processes. It is not possible to base a viable concept of psychodynamic psychotherapy, the nature of transference, or the efficacy of interpretation upon the radical concept of freedom, which is basic to existential philosophy. If psychiatrists wish to experiment with nonpsychoanalytic dynamic psychologies, then it is the author's opinion that the advancement of knowledge would be better served either by using existentialist concepts and principles consistently or by explicitly altering them in clearly defined ways for stated reasons, or by formulating psychodynamic hypotheses that do not lay claim to any foundation in existential philosophy.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The author has argued that existential psychology and psychiatry are not consistent with existential philosophy, from which they derive their basic concepts. Existential philosophy treats consciousness as an epistemic and ontological absolute while existential psychology and psychiatry acknowledge the existence of unconscious mental processes. It is not possible to base a viable concept of psychodynamic psychotherapy, the nature of transference, or the efficacy of interpretation upon the radical concept of freedom, which is basic to existential philosophy. If psychiatrists wish to experiment with nonpsychoanalytic dynamic psychologies, then it is the author's opinion that the advancement of knowledge would be better served either by using existentialist concepts and principles consistently or by explicitly altering them in clearly defined ways for stated reasons, or by formulating psychodynamic hypotheses that do not lay claim to any foundation in existential philosophy.

Key concepts: Existentialism, Unconscious mind, Consciousness, Epistemology, Psychodynamics, Interpretation (philosophy), Philosophy, Psychology

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Logical and Conceptual Problems of Existential Psychiatry — Research Paper | ScholarLens